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l  THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY 
Capital  gains  taxation  has  been  a  divisive  issue  in  Congress  at  least  since  the 
debates  surrounding  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986,  which,  aiming  to  eliminate  tax 
loopholes  and  shelters  and  preferences,  repealed  preferentially  low  tax  rates  for  long-term 
gains.’  To  bring  effective  capital  gains  tax  rates  back  down  again  was  President  Bush’s 
“top  priority  in  tax  policy.“2  In  1989,  Senate  Democrats  blocked  a  determined  drive  to 
reduce  effective  tax  rates  on  the  part  of  Bush,  Republican  Senators  Packwood,  Dole  and 
others,  and  a  few  Democratic  allies.3  The  administration  argued  that  the  tax  cuts  would 
stimulate  economic  growth  and  induce  asset  sales,  thereby  actually  increasing  federal  tax 
revenues;  Congressional  Democrats  countered  that  the  plan  benefited  mainly  the  wealthy, 
and  that  tax  revenues  would  in  fact  decline.4  The  Joint  Committee  on  Taxation  projected 
that  budget  shortfalls  beginning  in  1991  would  sum  to  about  $24  billion  by  1994-and 
that  most  of  the  direct  benefits  would  go  to  individuals  with  over  $200,000  in  taxable 
income.  House  Speaker  Thomas  S.  Foley  said  that  a  third  of  the  savings  would  be 
enjoyed  by  those  with  gross  incomes  over  one  million  dollars.5 
An  October,  1990  congressional  budget  agreement  cut  the  maximum  capital  gains 
tax  rate  from  33  to  28 percent.  The  cut  was  less  than  the  administration  had  sought,  and 
’ Capital  gains  received  preferential  income  tax treatment  from  1921 through  1987.  The  Revenue  Act  of 
1942 provided  for  a fifty  percent  exclusion  for noncorporate  capital  gains or  losses  on assets  held  over 
six months;  the  Revenue  Act  of  1978 raised  the exclusion  to sixty  percent.  These  exclusions  reduced  the 
effective  rate  from  approximately  49 to 28 percent.  The Economic  Recovery  Act  of  1981 reduced  the 
effective  rate  still  further,  to 20 percent,  as a result  of the reduction  in the top marginal  tax rate  from  70 
to 50  percent.  However,  the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986 eliminated  exclusions  for  capital  gains  after  1988. 
Corporate  capital  gains  were  taxed  at an alternative  rate of 25 percent  with  the  Internal  Revenue  Code 
of  1954, then  at 30 percent  with  the Tax  Reform  Act of  1969.  The  alternative  rate  was  reduced  to 28 
percent  by  the Revenue  Act  of  1978, and repealed  by the Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986, which  provided  for 
taxation  of  (taxable)  realized  capital  gains as ordinary  income.  Joint  Committee  on Taxation  (1990),  p. 
Il. 
* Elving  (1989),  p.  2299. 
3 Elving  (1990),  p.  1183. 
4 “Capital  Gains  Study  at a Standstill”  (1991,  anonymous),  p. 594; Elving  (1989)  pp.  2299-2302. 
5 Elving  (1989),  pp.  2299-2300. Hudson  &  Feder  2 
Bush  continued  to  press  for  further  rate  reductions;  but  significantly,  it  reestablished 
preferential  taxation,  as  the  maximum  rate  on  ordinary  income  was  now  3 1 percent.6 
Bush’s  January1991  budget  proposal  included  provisions  to reduce  the  tax 
rate  on  certain  capital  gains.  Individuals  would  be  allowed  to  exclude  a percentage  of  the 
gain  from  qualified  assets,  the  percentage  increasing  with  the  length  of the  holding  period. 
The  effective  tax rate  for  an  asset  held  three  years  or more,  for  example,  would  have  been 
19.6  percent  for  an  individual  in  the  2%percent  tax  bracket.’ 
A  year  later,  Congressional  Democrats  put  forth  their  own  plan  to  index  capital 
gains  for  inflation,  which,  they  argued,  was  a more  equitable  way  to  reduce  effective  tax 
rates.  Opponents  countered  that  the  wealthy  would  benefit  even  more  from  indexing  than 
from  Bush’s  plan-or  that  “indexing  would  not  provide  the  quick  stimulus  that  Bush 
claims  would  come  from  his  proposal”  to  slash  capital  gains  tax  rates.*  While  the 
proposal  to  index  gains  has  continued  support  today,  it  is  adamantly  opposed  by  the 
Treasury  on  grounds  of  administrative  unfeasibility.’ 
capital 
Last  year,  the  tax  cut  plan  of  Presidential  candidate  Bob  Dole  would  have  halved 
gains  tax  rates,  from  28  to  14 percent. 
Concern  that  a  capital  gains  tax  cut  would  eventually,  after  an  initial  sell-off, 
necessitate  higher  ordinary  income  tax  rates  to  meet  budget  shortfalls  “has  kept  the 
nation’s  business  community  from  monolithic  endorsement  of  the  proposals.“1° 
However,  proposals  to cut  capital  gains  taxes  have  increasingly  enjoyed  bipartisan  support 
in recent  months,  fueled  partly  by  the  run-up  of stock  prices  which  has  created  huge  paper 
gains.  President  Clinton’s  budget  proposals  of  January  1997  called  for  a  tax  exemption 
for  up  to  $500,000  in capital  gains  from  the  sale  of personal  residences,  and  it is reported 
that  he  has  signaled  his  willingness  to  contemplate  a  broad-based  cut  in  future 
6Pollack (1991),  p. 56. 
’ “In addition,  all depreciation  would  be recaptured  in full as ordinary  income.”  Joint  Committee  on 
Taxation  (1990),  p.  15.  “The  proposal  was introduced  by Senators  Packwood,  Dole  and Roth  as S. 
2071  . . . March  15, 1990.” 
* Cloud  and Cranford  (1992),  p. 393. 
9 Schlesinger  (1997),  p. A6. 
lo Elving  (1989),  p. 2300. Hudson  &  Feder  3 
negotiations,  perhaps  to  a  20  percent  maximum  rate. ’ ’  A  bill  introduced  in  January  by 
Senate  Republicans  would  reduce  the  effective  rate  from  28  percent  to  19.8  percent  for 
individuals  and  from  35  percent  to  28  percent  for  corporations,  and  would  also  index 
gains  for  inflation.  In  February,  Senate  Democratic  Majority  Whip  Wendeli  Ford 
announced  his  support  for  a  broad-based  capital  gains  tax  cut.”  As  The  WuIZ Street 
Journal  reports,  “Prospects  for  a big  cut  in the  capital-gains  tax  seem  better  this  year  than 
at any  time  since  the  federal  government  increased  tax  rates  a decade  ago  on  profits  from 
selling  investments.“‘3 
l  WHAT  Is  MISSING FROM THE  CAPITAL  GAINS  DEBATE? 
The  most  frequently  heard  arguments  for  reducing  capital  gains  taxes  are:  (1)  to 
reduce  the  “lock-in”  effect,  by  which  high  tax  rates  at  realization  deter  asset  sales;14 (2) 
to  relieve  a  disproportionate  burden  on  homeowners;  (3)  to  compensate  for  the  erosion 
of  capital  gains  by  inflation,  as  an  alternative  to  indexing;15  (4)  to  end  alleged  double 
taxation  of  both  capital  stocks  and  income  flows;  (5)  to  spur  productive  enterprise  and 
investment;  and  (6)  to  generate  more  tax  revenue  from  the  consequent  growth  in  asset 
sales  and  productivity. 
This  report  calls  attention  to  a  neglected  aspect  of  the  capital  gains  issue-one 
which  bears  importantly  on  the  fifth-  and  sixth-named  consequences. 
Much  of  the  capital  gains  debate  today  focuses  on  the  stock  market.  Business 
recipients  of capital  gains  are characterized  as small  innovative  firms  making  initial  public 
offerings  (IPOs).  In  recent  years  such  firms  have  been  responsible  for  a disproportionate 
share  of  new  hiring.  It  is hoped  that  corporations  will  be  able  to  raise  money  to  employ 
more  labor  and  invest  in more  plant  and  equipment  if buyers  of  their  stocks  can  sell  these 
I’ McTague  (1997),  Barrens,  Feb  2,  1997. URLz  <http:/lwww.barrons.com/bie/articlesl19970207ibudget.htm> 
I2 Hitt  (1997),  p. A2. 
I3 Schlesinger  (1997),  p. Al. 
I4 Some  argue that eliminating  step-up  of basis at death would  do more  to reduce  lock-in  than a rate  cut. 
See Joint  Committee  on Taxation  (1990),  p. 2 1; Gaffbey  (1991). 
I5 For  an analysis  of  the case  for  inflation  indexing,  see Gaffney  (199 1). Hudson  & Feder  4 
securities  with  less  of  a tax  bite.  Stock  market  gains  thus  are  held  to  stimulate  new  direct 
investment,  employment,  and  output. 
Typical  of  the  campaign  to  reduce  capital  gains  taxes  is  a  Wall  Street  Journal 
editorial,  “Capital  Gains:  Lift  the  Burden.”  Author  W.  Kurt  Hauser  argues  that  when  the 
capital  gains  tax  rate  was  increased  from  20 percent  to  28 percent  in  1989,  the  effect  was 
to  deter  asset  sales,  causing  a  decline  in  the  capital  gains  to  be  reaped  and  taxed.  He 
refers,  however,  only  to  stock  market  gains,  and  specifically,  to  equity  in  small 
businesses.  Citing  the  example  of  yacht  producers,  he  suggests  that  taxing  capital  gains 
on  stocks  issued  by  these  businesses  “locks  in”  capital  asset  sales,  thereby  deterring  new 
investment  and  hiring,  and  reducing  the  supply  of  yachts.16 
Others  contend  that  new  productive  investment  is relatively  insensitive  to  capital 
gains  tax  rates,  arguing,  for  example,  that  most  of  the  money  placed  in  venture-capital 
funds  come  from  tax-exempt  pension  funds,  endowments,  and  foundations.17 
What  is  missing  from  the  discussion  is  a  sense  of  proportion  as  to  how  capital 
gains  are  made.  Data  that  is  available  from  the  Department  of  Commerce,  the  IRS,  and 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board  indicate  that  roughly  two  thirds  of  the  economy’s  capital 
gains  are  taken,  not  in  the  stock  marke+-m-uch  less  in  new  offeringrs--but  in  real 
estate.” 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board  estimates  land  values  at  some  $4.4  trillion  for  1994. 
Residential  structures  add  $5.9  trillion,  and  other  buildings  another  $3.1  trillion.  This 
$13.4  trillion  of  real  estate  value  represents  two  thirds  of  the  total  $20  trillion  in  overall 
assets  for  the  United  States  economy.”  Real  estate  accounts  for  three-fourths  of  the 
economy’s  capital  consumption  allowances.  It  also  is  the  major  collateral  for  debt,  and 
generates  some  two-thirds  of  the  interest  paid  by  American  businesses.  Real  estate  taxes 
are  the  economy’s  major  wealth  tax,  although  their  yield  has  declined  as  a proportion  of 
I6 Hauser (1995). 
”  Venture  Economics  Information Services, cited in Schlesinger (1997), p. A6. 
” Federal  Reserve Board,  Flow-of-Funds  Statistics,  Balance Sheets for  the  US Economy.  See section 
5 regarding  capital  gains  on land  and buildings. 
I9  Balance  Sheets for  the  U.S. Economy:  1945-94, Table B.11. 100% 
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all  state  and  local  revenues,  from  70  percent  in  1930  to  about  one-fourth  today. 
Capital  gains  statistics  are  much  harder  to  come  by.  One  cannot  simply  measure 
the  increased  value  of  the  capital  stock,  for  part  of  the  rise  represents 
investment--production  of  new  capital-iather  than  appreciation  of  existing  capital  and 
land.  The  IRS  conducts  periodic  sampling  of  capital  gains  based  on  tax  returns,  and  its 
Statistics  on Income  presents  various  analyses  of  the  shares  of  total  capital  gains  reported 
by  the  economy’s  income  cohorts,  from  the  richest  five  percent  down.  The  samples  are 
admittedly  asymmetrical,  however,  and  some  of  the  categories  overlap.  Significantly,  for 
instance,  stock  market  gains  include  a large  component  of  land  and  other  real  estate  gains. 
This  policy  brief  seeks  to  elucidate  the  role  of real  estate  in the  capital  gains  issue, 
indicating  the  quantitative  orders  of magnitude  involved..  We  offer  two  main  observations. 
First,  generous  capital  consumption  allowances  (CCAs)  greatly  magnify  the  proportion 
of  real  estate  income  taken  as  taxable  capital  gains.  Capital  gains  accrue  not  only  on 
newly  constructed  buildings,  of  course,  but  also  on  land  and  old  buildings  being  sold  and 
resold.  Our  tax  code  allows  for  properties  to  be  re-depreciated  by  their  new  owners  after 
a sale  or  swap,  permitting  real  estate  investors  to  recapture  principal  again  and  again  on 
the  same  structure.  When  CCAs  have  been  excessive  relative  to  true  economic 
depreciation,  as  they  were  during  the  198Os,  capital  gains  have  been  commensurately 
larger  than  the  actual  increase  in  property  prices.  As  Charts  la  and  lb  illustrate,  capital 
consumption  allowances  in  real  estate  dwarf  those  in  other  industries. 
Second,  very  little  of  real  estate  cash  flow  is  taxable  as  ordinary  income,  so  the 
capital  gains  tax  is  currently  the  only  major  federal  levy  paid  by  the  real  estate  industry. 
CCAs  and  tax-deductible  mortgage  interest  payments  combine  to  exempt  most  of  real 
estate  cash  flow  from  the  income  tax.  This  encourages  debt  pyramiding  as  it throws  the 
burden  of  public  finance  onto  other  taxpayers. 
A central  conclusion  of our  study  is that  better  statistics  on  asset  values  and  capital 
gains  are  needetir,  more  to the  point,  a better  accounting  format.  The  economic  effects 
of  a  capital  gains  tax  depend  upon  how  the  gains  are  made.  The  present  GNPKNIPA Hudson  & Feder  6 
format  fails  to differentiate  between  wealth  and  overhead;  between  value  from  production 
and  value  from  obligation.  In  particular,  theory  and  measurement  should  distinguish  real 
estate  from  other  sources  of  capital  gains----and,  within  the  category  of  real  estate, 
distinguish  land  from  built  improvements.  Markets  for  immovable  structures  and  for  land 
have  distinctive  inherent  features”  and  are  shaped  by  distinctive  institutional  constraints. 
Our  second  major  conclusion  is that,  at least  until  re-depreciation  of  second-hand 
buildings  is disallowed,  a capital  gains  tax  cut  would  be  unlikely  to  stimulate  much  new 
investment  and  employment  from  its  largest  beneficiary,  the  real  estate  industry. 
Depreciation  allowances  and  mortgage  interest  absorb  so  much  of  the  ongoing 
cash  flow  as  to  leave  little  taxable  income.  Mortgage  interest  payments,  which  now 
consume  the  lion’s  share  of  cash  flow,  are  tax-deductible,  while  CCAs  offset  much  of 
what  remains  of  rental  income.  On  an  industry-wide  basis,  in fact,  NIPA  statistics  reveal 
that  depreciation  offsets  more  than  the  total  reported  income.  As  Charts  2a,  2b,  and  2c 
illustrate,  real  estate  corporations  and  partnerships  have  recently  reported  net  losses  year 
after  year. 
The  result  is  that  real  estate  corporations  pay  minimal  income  taxes-some  $1.3 
billion  in  1988,  just  one  percent  of  the  $137  billion  paid  by  corporate  America  as  a 
whole.21  Comparable  figures  are  not  available  on  non-corporate  income  tax  liability,  but 
the  FIRE  sector  (finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate)  reported  negative  income  of  $3.4 
billion  in  1988,  out  of  a total  $267  billion  of  non-farm  proprietors’  income.22  These  three 
symbiotically  linked  sectors  thus  were  left  with  only  capital  gains  taxes  to  pay  on  their 
cash  flow. 
The  central  point  for  capital  gains  tax  policy  is  that  taxable  capital  gains  in  real 
estate  consist  of  more  than  just  the  increase  in  land  and  building  prices.  They  represent 
the  widening  margin  of  sales  price  over  the  property’s  depreciated  value.  The  tax 
”  Gaffney  (1994a). 
*’ US  Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 6.18. 
‘*  NIPA  Table  6.12. $100 
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accountant’s  book-value  gains  result  from  charging  off  capital  consumption  allowances 
as  a tax  credit  against  cash  flow.  The  more  generous  are  the  capital  consumption  write- 
offs  for  real  estate,  the  more  rapidly  a property’s  book  value  is written  down.  The  fiction 
of  fast  write-off  is eventually  “caught”  as a capital  gain  when  the  real  estate  is either  sold 
or  refinanced. 
Excessive  depreciation  allowances  thus  convert  ordinary  income  into  capital 
gains.  Moreover,  capital  gains  are  the  only  point  at  which  most  real  estate  income  is 
taxed  To  abolish  the  capital  gains  tax  would  annul  the  entire  accumulated  income  tax 
liability  which  real  estate  owners  have  converted  into  a  capital  gains  obligation.  The 
income  written  off  over  the  years  as  over-depreciation  would  not  be  caught  at  all.  The 
economy’s  largest  industry  would  have  its  income  rendered  tax-free. 
Capital  gains  already  are  being  taxed  much  more  lightly  than  ordinary  income, 
especially  when  deferrals  and  exemptions  are taken  into  account.  Even  if exemptions  were 
eliminated  and  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  were  set  as high  as the  ordinary  income  tax  rate, 
the  effective  burden  (what  economists  call  the  present  value  of  the  tax)  would  be 
substantially  lower  to  the  extent  that  the  capital  gains  tax  is paid  only  retroactively,  upon 
realization  (sale)  rather  than  as  the  gains  actually  accrue. 
One  therefore  must  doubt  the  claim  that  cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  would 
increase  government  revenue  by  encouraging  investors  to  sell  their  assets.  Kurt  Hauser’s 
editorial  asserts  that  “trillions  of dollars  are  locked  up  in mature,  relatively  non-productive 
low-cost  assets,”  but  does  not  explain  that  most  of  these  “mature”  assets  take  the  form  of 
depreciated  real  estate.  Although  real  estate  prices  have  stagnated,  the  book  value  of 
buildings  has  been  diminished  by  much  more.  Now  that  these  buildings  are  fully 
depreciated,  owners  have  an  incentive  to  sell  or  swap  them  once  again  so  as  to  continue 
sheltering  their  income.  The  effect  has  been  to  leave  substantial  capital  gains  to  be 
declared  in  the  near  future,  while  the  properties  can  be  sold  for  much  more  than  their $6 
-6 
-8 
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depreciated  value.‘3 
While  it  is  often  true  that  the  prospect  of  earning  capital  gains  is  what  induces 
new  investment  to  be  made,  applying  further  rate  cuts  to  real  estate  gains  cannot  be 
expected  to  spur  much  new  construction  activity  under  present  fiscal  institutions.  Clearly 
a “capital”  gains  tax  cut  cannot  cause  the  production  of  more  land;  land  (as  distinct  from 
capital  improvements)  is made  by  nature,  not  by  the  landowner.  As  to  buildings,  more  of 
the  tax benefit  would  go  to  speculators  in existing  capital  than  to  investors  in construction 
and  renewal.  We  also  doubt  that  a further  rate  reduction  is likely  to  accelerate  real  estate 
turnover  by  reversing  a  “lock-in  effect.”  Turnover  is  strongly  affected  by  depreciation 
rates.  In  periods  of  rapid  write-offs-most  strikingly  during  the  198Os, when  real  estate 
could  be  written  off  faster  than  in  any  other  period-buildings  tend  to  be  sold  as  soon  as 
they  are  depreciated.  The  1986 reforms  reduced  the  incentives  for  this  rapid  turnover,  but 
the  principle  is  clear:  When  depreciation  rates  are  high,  there  is  a powerful  tax-induced 
incentive  to  sell  a building  when  it  is  fully  depreciated.24  The  basic  motivation  at  work, 
of  course,  is  to  avoid  taking  investment  returns  as  taxable  income.  Investors  prefer  to 
declare  as  much  of  their  income  as possible  in  the  form  of  capital  gains,  which  are  taxed 
later  and  at  a  lower  rate. 
Sound  tax  policy  requires  an  understanding  of  the  fiscal  assumptions  which 
underlie  our  tax  code  and  the  mythical  world  of  national  income  accounting.  Far  from 
being  a  potent  stimulus  to  new  investment,  a  general  capital  gains  tax  cut  would 
preferentially  benefit  owners  of  already  depreciated  buildings  speculators  in  already 
seasoned  stocks,  leading  to  further  deterioration  of economic  health.  It cannot  be  expected 
to  raise  the  volume  of  capital  gains  declared  by  enough  to  increase  the  total  tax  revenue 
generated. 
23 In  these  statistics  we  find  the  explanation  for  the  fact  that reported  capital  gains  have  fallen  off  since 
1989. The reason  is not, as Hauser  (1995) claims, because  the capital gains tax hike has induced fewer  sales 
of stocks or direct business assets that have increased  in value, but because  the collapsing  real estate bubble 
has left  in its wake fewer  land-value  gains to be taken. Even  assuming  that investors  were  sensitive  to the 
increased  capital  gains tax rate,  there  have been  fewer  gains to reap  since prices  peaked  in  1989. 
24  For  an analysis  of  lock-in  and capital  gains taxation,  see Gaffhey  (1990). Hudson & Feder  9 
Much  of the  statistical  measurement  problem  derives  from  the  fact  that  capital  gains 
in  real  estate  differ  firorn those  in  other  industries.  While  ah  investors  presumably  would 
prefer  to  take  their  income  in non-taxable  forms  and  to  defer  whatever  tax  obligation  is due, 
the  tax  benefits  to  the  real  estate  industry  have  no  analog  in  manufacturing,  agriculture, 
power  generation,  transportation,  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  or  other  services.  Corporations 
in these  sectors  pay  taxes  on  their  net  incomes.  Out  of their  after-tax  earnings  they  then  pay 
dividends,  on  which  stockholders  in turn  must  pay  income  tax.  By  contrast,  little  or  none  of 
the  rental  cash  flow  received  by  real  estate  investors  is  taxable,  because  generous  capital 
consumption  allowances  are  treated  as costs  and  deducted  Erom the  net  income  reported  to 
the  IRS. 
The  effect  of calculating  capital  gains  for  real  estate  on  the  basis  of depreciated  book 
values  may  be illustrated  by the  following  example.  A building  bought  in  1985  has  probably 
been  fully  written  off  today,  thanks  to  the  generous  CCAs  enacted  by  the  198 1 tax  code 
that  remained  in place  through  1986.  For  a parcel  bought  in  1985  for  $100  million  and  sold 
today  for  $110  million,  the  recorded  gain  is not  merely  the  10 percent  increase  in  market 
price,  but  the  entire  value  of  the  building,  perhaps  $65  million  based  on  the  real  estate 
industry’s  average  land-to-building  assessment  ratios. 
Industrial  investors  must  pay  tax  on  their  accruals  of  unsold  inventories  as  they 
mount  up,  as  ifthey  were  sold  for  cash.  PubWing  companies,  for  instance,  owe  taxes  on 
books  that  remain  unsold  at  the  end  of  the  year,  which  leads  to  fast  liquidation  of  such 
inventories  and  often  to  the  pulping  of  unsold  books.  A  shift  in  publishing  policy  has  taken 
place  toward  faster  sellers  and  smaller  print  runs. 
Factory  owners  usually  must  junk  their  machinery  when  it  wears  out.  At  the  very 
least,  it  is  sold  off  at  a  nominal  price  and  replaced  with  higher-productivity  equipment, 
enabling  producers  to  remain  competitive  in  the  face  of  technological  progress.  Industrial 
depreciation  allowances  are  thus  well  justified,  and  rarely  need  to  be  offset  by  subsequent 
capital  gains  declarations.  Real  estate,  however,  is depreciated  more  than  once,  as  a matter 
of  course.  Unlike  other  industrial  assets,  buildings  that  have  been  depreciated  just  once Hudson  & Feder  10 
long  run.  Nevertheless,  it is principally  the  location  that  becomes  more  valuable.  Rising  land 
values  tend  to  more  than  offset  any  decline  in  building  values.  In  practice,  a  significant 
portion  of land  appreciation  tends  often  to  be imputed  to  buildings,  further  expanding  CCAs 
by allowing  even  land  to  be  partly  depreciated.*’ 
Thus  the  putative  beneficiaties  of  cutting  capital  gains  taxes-direct  investors- 
suffer  less  from  high  capital  gains  tax  rates  than  from  the  treatment  of  much  of  their 
capital  gain  as  ordinary  income,  which  is  taxed  at  higher  rates.  In  real  estate,  on  the 
other  ha&,  depreciation  effectively  converts  much  of  ordinary  income  to  capital  gains. 
Whereas  industrial  investors  pay  tax  on  rising  investment  in unsold  inventories,  even  when 
no  sales  revenue  is received,  real  estate  investors  pay  tax  neither  on  rental  income  nor  on 
increases  in property  values  as they  accrue.  The  industry  actually  receives  cash  income,  but 
for  tax  purposes  reports  a  cash  loss.  Because  real  estate  and  manufacturing  face  such 
different  cash  flow  tax  treatment,  it  is  misleading  to  take  the  manufacturing  industry  as  a 
proxy  for  real  estate  in discussing  the  effect  of cutting  capital  gains  tax  rates. 
The  greatest  accounting  distortion  for  the  real  estate  industry  occurs  in  the  case 
of re-dkpreciiation  of  buildings  that  already  have  been  depreciiaed  at  least  once.  This  re- 
depreciation  occurs  following  ownership  transfers;  the  CCA  is attached  not  to  the  physical 
asset,  but  to  the  change  of ownership.  As the  building  is resold  at rising  prices,  investors  are 
allowed  to  re-depreciate  them  again  and  again-and  to  write  off  these  CCAs  against  their 
income,  as if they  were  suffering  an erosion  of wealth.  Thus,  most  capital  gains  in real  estate 
represent  “repeat  gains”  over  unrealistically  written-down  book  values.  This  accounting 
fiction  enables  real  estate  investors  to  continue  indefinitely  to  take  their  income  in the  lightly 
taxed  form  of capital  gains.26 
Landlords  already  deduct  from  earnings  as  normal  business  expenses  their 
maintenance  and  repair  expenditures,  undertaken  to  counteract  the  wear  and  tear  of 
buildings.  A  rule  of  thumb  in  the  real  estate  industry  is  that  such  expenditures  typically 
consume  about  ten  percent  of  rental  revenue.  More  importantly,  although  nearly  all 
25 GafGey  (1993). 
26  Another  kind of subsidy occurs  in the sphere of fzum real estate.  Speculation  in farmland is reflected in 
the high  ratio of farm  prices to gross receipts.  This  suggests that, on the one hand,  “gentleman  fanning” 
occurs  in near-suburban  areas as a means of minimizing  property  taxes (thanks  to the lower appraisals  of 
land zoned  for agricultural  use), and on the other  hand,  speculation  in anticipation  that the land 
subsequently  will be rezoned  for commercial  and residential  development. Hudson & Feder  11 
land  gains  are  made  Mly  taxable,  there  is little  reason  to  assume  that  physical  deterioration 
should  be  compensated  by  a special  allowance  to  enable  the  landlord  to  recover  his  capital 
investment  within  a given  number  of years. 
Even  when  overall  real  estate  values  fell  in  the  early  199Os,  the  IRS  nonetheless 
recorded  capital  gains  taken  on  properties  built  before  the  frantic  price  run-up  of  the  late 
1980s.  Over  a fifteen  year  period,  the  value  of  the  building  in our  example  might  have  been 
written  down  to  near  zero.  Ifit  were  sold  for just  its  original  purchase  price,  the  entire  sales 
price  of the  building  would  be  reported  as a capital  gain. 
Although  the  198 1 depreciation  giveaway  was  replaced  by  the  1986  revision  of  the 
tax  code,  buildings  already  under  construction  and  about  to  come  onto  the  rental  market 
were  grandfathered  into  the  old  code.  Significantly,  today  these  buildings  have  been  fully 
depreciated  and  therefore  are  probably  about  to  be  sold,  at  least  for  book-keeping 
purposes-owners  may  buy  their  own  buildings  under  different  partnerships,  or  swap  them 
for  similar  buildings  with  other  owners.  Their  new  owners  can  begin  to  depreciate  them  all 
over  again,  after  duly  paying  capital  gains  taxes  on  the  buildings’  increase  over  their  near- 
zero  book  value.  If  they  do  not  sell  and  re-depreciate  their  buildings,  the  owners  will 
have  to  begin  paying  income  taxes  on  their  operating  cash  jlow  that  hitherto  was 
sheltered  by  depreciation  allowances  that  have  now  run  out.  This  lends  a renewed  note 
of urgency  to  the  persistent  campaign  to cut  capital  gains  tax  rates. 
Because  excessive  depreciation  allowances  favor  real  estate  speculation  relative  to 
industrial  production,  they  discourage  new  direct  investment  and  employment.  To  reduce 
the  capital  gains  tax-the  only  significant  remaining  source  of  federal  revenue  from  real 
estate-would  divert  even  more  savings  into  the  purchase  and  sale of existing  buildings. 
subsequently  will be rezoned  for commercial  and residential  development. Hudson & Feder  12 
3.  How  Mortgage  Debt  Converts  Rent  into  Interest 
Depreciation  rules  are  not  the  only  reason  why  the  real  estate  sector  declares  little 
taxable  income.  Out  of  their  gross  rental  income,  landlords  pay  state  and  local  property 
taxes,  a  tiny  modicum  of  income  tax,  and  interest  on  their  mortgage  debt.  A  large 
proportion  of  cash  flow  is  turned  over  to  lenders  as  mortgage  payments.  Since  the  early 
197Os,  interest  paid  by  the  real  estate  industry  has  been  much  larger  than  the  figures 
reported  for  net  rental  income.  As  Charts  3a,  3b,  3c,  and  3d  illustrate,  real  estate  investors 
and  homeowners  have  become  the  financial  sector’s  prime  customers.  According  to  the 
Federal  Reserve  Board,  1994  mortgage  debt  of  $4.3  trillion  represented  some  46  percent  of 
the  economy’s  $9.3  trillion  private  nonfinancial  debt,  and  a third  of  the  total  $12.8  trillion 
U.S.  debt.27 NIPA  statistics  indicate  that  about  70  percent  of  loans  to  business  borrowers 
currently  are  made  to  the  real  estate  sector,  making  it  the  major  absorber  of  savings  and 
payer  of interest.28 
Most  cash  flow  now  ends  up  neither  with  developers  nor  with  the  tax  authorities, 
but  as  interest  paid  to  banks,  insurance  companies  and  other  mortgage  lenders.  In  fact, 
mortgage  interest  now  absorbs  seven  percent  of  national  income,  up  from  just  one  percent 
in the  late  1940s.  In  1993  (the  most  recent  year  for  which  NIPA  statistics  are  available)  the 
real  estate  sector  generated  some  $326  billion  in interest  payments,  more  than  it contributed 
in income  taxes  and  state  and  local  property  taxes  together.  Meanwhile,  over  the  past  half 
century,  net  declarable  income  plus  capital  consumption  allowances  and  property  taxes  have 
been  cut  in  half  as  a proportion  of  national  income,  from  over  ten  percent  to  less  than  five 
percent.  Thus  interest  is  the  real  estate  industry’s  major  cost,  and  as  such,  has  helped  to 
minimize  the  real  estate  industry’s  income  tax  liability. 
One  effect  of  favorable  depreciation  and  capital  gains  tax  treatment  is to  spur  debt 
pyramiding  for  the  real  estate  industry.  The  tax  structure  provides  a distortionary  incentive 
for  real  estate  holders  to  borrow  excessively,  converting  rental  income  into  a  nontaxable 
mortgage  interest  cost  while  waiting  for  capital  gains  to  accrue.  This,  alongside  financial 
deregulation  of  the  nation’s  S&Ls,  was  a  major  factor  in  the  over-building  spree  of  the 
”  Balance  Sheetsfor  the  US Economy,  Table L2, line 8. 
28  “Business borrowers”  do not include  homeowners,  but only non-corporate  real estate partnerships  and 
real estate corporations.  Mortgage  interest  paid by homeowners  is treated  as a “consumer  expense.” $600 
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In  addition  to  paying  interest  to  their  bankers,  real  estate  investors  turn  over  the 
capital  consumption  portion  of  their  cash  flow  as  loan  amortization  payments.  A  major 
lesson  from  examining  the  NIPA  accounts  is  that  creditors  have  ended  up  with  both  the 
mortgage  interest  and  the  CCAs.  Many  investors  operate  at a nominal  loss,  and  even  on  the 
margin  of  solvency,  leveraging  their  properties  to  the  hilt.  Their  hope  is to  ride  the  wave  of 
increasing  land  values  and  “cash  out”  by  selling  their  property  for  more  than  they  paid.  In 
pursuit  of  this  opportunity  to  earn  capital  gains,  they  seek  to  control  as  much  property  as 
they  can,  and  are  willing  to  forego  current  income  in return. 
Sometimes,  of  course,  no  capital  gains  accrue.  In  some  highly  conspicuous  cases, 
landlords  have  walked  away  from  their  properties,  leaving  their  mortgage  lenders  holding 
the  bag.  This  is what  led  to  the  $500  billion  FSLIC  bailout  by  the  Reconstruction  Finance 
Corporation.  Many  smaller  real  estate  parcels  likewise  were  abandoned  in central  city  areas 
from  New  York  to  Los  Angeles.  Indeed,  this  process  was  part  of  an  international 
phenomenon,  extending  from  Canary  Wharf  in  London  to  Tokyo’s  Bubble  Economy  of 
1985-1980.  Nevertheless,  holding  onto  properties  by  paying  off  their  mortgage  loans  is 
made  easier  by  favorable  tax  treatment.  Indeed,  nominal  tax  losses  during  1984-91  enabled 
building  investors  not  only  to  earn  a rising  cash  flow,  but  to  gain  tax  credits  to  shelter  their 
otherwise  taxable  income  earned  in other  sectors. 
Real  estate  is pledged  to  mortgage  lenders  as collateral  in case  the  promised  interest 
payments  fail  to  materialize.  Capital  gains  have  been  collateralized  into  new  and  larger 
loans  decade  after  decade,  increasing  the  mortgage  burden  that  transforms  rental 
income  and  depreciation  allowances  into  interest  payments.  Ultimately,  the  financial 
rentiers  end  up  with  most  of  the  cash  jlow  which  landlortid  government  tax 
collectors-relinquish. 
Tax-deductibility  of  mortgage  costs  does  not  impair  government  revenues  if 
mortgage  lenders  pay  taxes  on  their  interest  income.  Moreover,  lenders  may  be  able  to  shift 
part  of  the  tax  burden  to  borrowers  by  charging  higher  interest  rates.29  Actually,  however, 
much  interest  income  manages  to  avoid  taxation,  such  as that  of  banks  adding  to  their  loss 
coverage  funds  (or  otherwise  offsetting  their  income)  or  individuals  with  tax  shelters.  The 
insurance  and  financial  industries  have  long  obtained  virtual  tax  exemption  for  their  income. 
B Also, insofar  as mortgage  interest  is treated  preferentially  relative  to other forms  of interest,  there  will be 3d. Components 
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immediately.  Many  take  years  of  negotiation  and  litigation  before  they  are  paid  out.  In 
fact,  the  courts  in  many  states  are  notoriously  backed  up  by  such  litigation.  Insurance 
company  critics  point  out  that  by the  time  many  companies  actually  pay  out  on  their  claims, 
the  delays  have  saved  them  enough  by  deferment  of  income  taxes  to  meet  the  entire  cost. 
Also,  pension  funds  and  non-profits  do  not  have  to  pay  income  taxes  or  capital  gains  taxes. 
(Non-profits  include  universities,  which  are  major  real  estate  investors.)  Mutual  funds  have 
fewer  tax  breaks,  but  mutual  funds  for  real  estate  typically  are  organized  as  real  estate 
investment  trusts  (REITs),  which  often  generate  tax  losses  for  their  investors  to  charge 
against  other  income. 
The  result  is that  the  FIRE  sector  as  a whole  has  been  subsidized  at  the  expense  of 
direct  industrial  investors  and  consumers.  As  Charts  4a,  4b,  and  4c  illustrate,  compared  to 
interest  charges  and  property  taxes,  the  reported  $150  billion  in rental  cash  flow  is relatively 
small.  Net  taxable  income  is smaller  yet.  Just  $24  billion  in rental  income  (and  an $86  billion 
cash  flow)  was  reported  by  small  building  owners,  that  is,  owners  whose  primary  source  of 
income  was  not  real  estate.  $130  billion  was  earned  by partnerships  (the  most  common  form 
of  business  organization  in the  real  estate  industry),  while  real  estate  corporations  reported 
a $4 billion  net  loss  (but  a $3 billion  net  cash  flow)  in  1993. 
Chart  5  tracks  the  relative  growth  of  the  finance,  insurance,  and  real  estate  sector 
using  Labor  Department  employment  figures.  It  shows  that  what  the  classical  economists 
called  “productive”  labor  has  remained  constant  since  1929,  while  virtually  all growth  has 
been  in government  (mainly  state  and  local)  and  private  sector  services-mainly  in the  FIRE 
sector.  Tax  subsidies  may  largely  explain  why  the  FIRE  sector  has  been  the  most  rapidly 
growing  part  of  the  economy  over  the  past  half  century.  This  is the  conceptual  context  in 
which  we  should  view  the  NIPA  statistics, Hudson  & Fedex 
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4.  Capital  Gains  Taxation  in Real  Estate 
Tax  rates  on  capital  gains  historically  have  been  low  compared  to  income  tax  rates 
(Table  1). Even  more  important  is the  fact  that  capital  gains  taxes  are  paid  only  at the  time 
of  realization,  that  is, when  the  asset  is  sold,  not  as the  gains  actually  accrue.  The  longer  a 
tax  is  deferred  (and  the  higher  is  the  imputed  rate  of  interest),  the  lower  is  its  discounted 
present  value. 
The  effective  rate  is further  reduced  by  numerous  exclusions  and  exemptions.  With 
regard  to  real  estate,  for  example,  homeowners  enjoy  a $125,000  exclusion  for  capital  gains 
on  sales  of  their  primary  homes,  as  long  as  they  recycle  the  proceeds  into  buying  a  new 
residence  within  a  year.  Homeowners  over  55  are  permitted  to  sell  their  houses  without 
having  to  pay  any  tax  on  their  capital  gain,  as long  as they  buy  a new  residence  of  equal  or 
higher  value.  The  stated  rationale  for  these  concessions  is that  to  tax  residential  capital  gains 
would  make  homeowners  pay  taxes  just  to  stay  in  the  same  economic  position  when  they 
move  to  take  new jobs  in other  cities  or  to  retire.  President  Clinton’s  recent  proposal  would 
further  extend  homeowners’  tax  exclusions. 
No  capital  gains  duties  are  levied  on 
real  estate  may  begin  re-depreciating  their 
(typically  higher)  transfer  price.  The  estates 
estates  passing  to  heirs.  Indeed,  inheritors  of 
income-yielding  buildings  afresh  at  the  new 
bequeathed  by  the  richest  one  percent  of  the 
population  (over  $600,000  in value)  are  now  taxed  at  a 55 percent  rate  if not  sheltered,  but 
of  course  these  are  the  estates  most  likely  to  shelter  inheritance  and  gift  bequests.  For 
instance,  assets  given  as gifts  are  taxed  only  at the  time  they  come  to  be  sold.30 If the capital 
gains  tax  were  reduced  or  abolished,  the  deferral  would  become  permanent. 
AIost-capitalgainsreaped  bybusinesspartnerships~~e-tom  real -estate  firms,  which 
shelter  personal  income  by  avoiding  incorporation.  IRS  stat&ties  ranking  capital  gains  in 
terms  of  how  long  the  assets  were  held  show  that  many  of  these  gains  represent  quick 
“flips.*  Often  these  are  Iand  that  has  been  rezoned  from  a  row-va.Iue  to  a  high-value  use. 
Retaining  the  capital  gains  tax  would  have  little  effect  on  deterring  such  speculation. 
Properties  held  for  Ionger  periods  oftime  by these  partnerships  typi&IIy  are  soId  or 
swapped  after  having  been  fully  depreciated.  Swaps’  have  long  been  permitted  to  the  real Hudson  & Feder 
Table  1.  The  Evolution  of Capital  Gains  Tax  Rates 
194243  25%  25%  88%  40% 
194445  25  25  94  40 
1946-50  25  25  91  38 
195 1  25  25  87.2  50.8 
1952-53  26  26  88  52 
1954  26  26  87  52 
1955-63  25  25  87  52 
1964  25  25  77  50 
196547  25  25  70  48 
196849  25  27.5  70  48 
1970  29.5  28  70  48 
1971  32.5  30  70  48 
1972-78  (Ckt)  35  30  70  48 
1978  (Nov)-June  ‘8 1  28  28  70  46 
June ‘81-86  20  28  50  46 
1987  28  31  38.5  40 
1988-89  33  34  33  34 
1990-92  8  34  31  34 
1993-95  28  35  39.6  35 
Maximum  Capital  Gains 
Tax  Rate (%) 
Individuals  Corw-ations 
Top Marginal  Income Tax  Rate 
Individuals  CorDontions 
Source: American  CounciI  for Capital  Formation,  Center for Policy Research,  “Update: Questions and 
Answers on Capital  Gains,”  Sept.  1995,  based on Joint Committee  on Taxation  (1995),  “Tax Treatment  of 
Capital  Gains and Losses,”  JCW-95,  February  13,1995;and  Oflke  of the Secretary  of the Treasury, 
Ofke  of Tax  Ana@sis  (1985),  “Report to Congress  on the Capital  Gains Tax  Reductions  of  1978.” Hudson & Fe&r  16 
many  almost  perpetually  free  of  income  taxation.  The  logic  for  this  loophole  seems  at  first 
glance  to  be  much  like  that  for  personal  homeowners’  exemptions  in  selling  a home  to  move 
somewhere  else,  without  having  to  pay  a capital  gain  tax  in the  process;  but  the  analogy  is 
specious.  Homeowners  cannot  take  a depreciation  tax  credit  unless  their  property  generates 
rental  income,  and  most  do  not  generate  any  income  against  which  to  claim  CCAs3’  In 
contrast,  the  capital  gains  which  commercial  real  estate  investors  record  for  income-tax 
purposes  are  calculated,  not  merely  on  the  gain  in  the  property’s  market  price  (as  with 
owner-occupied  homes),  but  on  the  excess  of  selling  price  over  depreciated  book  value. 
Major  commercial  real  estate  investors  such  as  pension  funds,  insurance  companies 
and  other  large  institutions  are  exempt  from  capital  gains  taxes,  as  are  foreign  investors.  In 
addition  to  playing  a  dominant  role  in  real  estate,  these  institutional  investors  own  nearly 
half  of  all U.S.  equities.32 
For  similar  reasons,  Fazzari  and  Herzon  note  in  a  Levy  Economics  Institute  brief 
that  “the  ‘effective’  year-to-year  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  (sometimes  called  the  ‘accrual- 
equivalent’  tax  rate)  is actually  lower  than  the  statutory  rate.“33 They  estimate  the  effective 
rate  by  halving  the  statutory  rate  to  account  for  the  numerous  exclusions  and  exemptions- 
and  then  halving  it  again  to  reflect  the  benefits  of  deferring  taxes  to  the  time  capital  gains 
are  realized  rather  than  paying  upon  accrual  If  this  is  correct,  then  for  today’s  28  percent 
capital  gains  tax,  the  first  halving  produces  an  effective  tax  rate  of  14  percent;  the  second 
reduces  it  to  just  7  percent.  To  cut  the  (statutory)  rate  to  14  percent,  as  Senator  Dole 
proposed,  would  reduce  the  effective  capital  gains  tax  rate  to  roughly  3.5  percent. 
31  Homeowners  do receive  imputed  rental  income,  which  is not subject to the income  tax. 
32  Minarik  (1992),  p. 20. 
33  Fazzari  and Hereon  (1995). Hudson&Feder 
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l  THE 1985  IRS  SURVEY 
In view  of  the  fact  that  real  estate  is the  economy’s  largest  asset  category-and  land 
its  major  component-it  is  desirable  to  put  the  capital  gains  debate  in  perspective  by 
compiling  adequate  statistics  to  trace  land  and  building  values.  Unfurtunatefy,  published 
statistics  do  not permit  reliable  estimates  of  capital  gains  in  real  estate  The  most  recent 
benchmark  for  capital  gains  in  the  US  economy  is  an  IRS  sampling  of  capital  gains 
declarations  on  1985  income  tax  returns,  prepared  in connection  with  the  Tax  Reform  Act 
of  1986.  By  1989-90  these  data  were  analyzed  in two  studies.34  Subsequent  estimates  have 
been  published  by the  IRS  in its Statistics  on Income,  but  cover  only  a portion  of the  capital 
gains  spectrum. 
equal 
these 
other 
The  IRS  benchmark  survey  estimated  1985  capital  gains  at  $208  billion,  an  amount 
to  only  6.4  percent  of  that  year’s  $3.3  trillion  national  income.  An  analysis  of  how 
capital  gains  were  distributed  as  between  land  and  buildings,  plant  and  equipment, 
direct  investment,  and  the  stock  market  indicates  that  the  economy’s  capital  gains  are 
mostly  in real  estate,  and  in greater  proportion  than  the  IRS  benchmark  study  suggests.  For 
properties  sold  during  the  year,  including  the  values  embodied  in stock-market  equities,  we 
interpret  the  IRS  survey  as  suggesting  land  value  gains  of  about  $97  billion  (Chart  6).  This 
does  not  include  institutional  or  foreign  real  estate  holdings,  for  these  are  not  subject  to 
taxation  and  thus  were  excluded  from  the  IRS  sample.  The  IRS  statistics  show  only  what 
individual  persons  who  sold  assets  in  1985  were  declaring  on  their  tax  returns.  Table  2 
tracks  land  gains  as a percentage  of total  reported  capital  gains  for the  1985  IRS  data. 
Within  these  limitations  of  scope,  sales  of  principal  residences3’  totaled  $37  billion, 
accounting  for  19  percent  of  the  capital  gains  sample.  However,  the  statistics  were 
swamped  by  the  $125,000  exclusion  for  capital  gains  on  safes  of  owner-occupied  homes. 
This  exclusion  was  so  large,  coming  as it did just  as the  real  estate  bubble  was  peaking,  that 
it reduced  the  proportion  of  taxable  capital  gains  accounted  for  by  residential  sales  from  19 
percent  to just  1.1 percent  of the  sample. 
34  Ho&  Hostetter  and Labate  (1989 and also  1990). 
35  Reported  on Form  2 119. 6. National  Income  Plus  Capital  Gains  In Land  - 1985 
In Billions  of Dollars 
$500 
$259 
$167 
$92 
$452 
$2,606 
\ 
Total  Land  and  Other  Natural 
Resource  Gains  (Estimate) 
Federal  Reserve  Estimate 
IRS  Reported  Capital  Gains 
(l/20  of All Land  Held) 
Total  National  Income 
$3,058 
Capital 
Gains 
Source: NIPA, IRS Huckm&Feder 
Table  2.  Estimated  Land  Gains  as a Percentage 
of Total  Reported  Capital  Gains,  1985 
Source  of  1985  Gains  Percent  x  % Land  =  Land  Gains  %Capiti  Other  as 
of Tot31  Gains  as %  Total  lmpnmts  %  of  Total 
Land  7.0 
Farmland  0.9 
Distribution  f?om  partnerships, 
fiduciaries  and  S-corporations  9.5 
Business  real  estate  10.3 
Rental  real  estate  11.8 
Principal  residences 
Corporate  stock 
Mutual  f&ds 
19.0 
33.0 
1.0 
Bonds  and  other  wxnities  0.8 
Commodities  and  f$tures  0.2 
Business  machinery/equipment  1.5 
Farm  livestock  1.0 
Timber  0.2 
Other  assets  3.9 
100% 
100% 
80% 
80% 
40% 
40% 
20% 
20% 
7.0 
0.9 
7.6 
8.2 
4.7 
7.6 
6.6 
0.2 
10%  0.9 
20%  2.1 
60%  7.1 
60%  11.4 
20%  6.6 
20%  0.2 
TOTAL  100.0%  42.9%  28.3% 
Soutce:  USTreasury Hudson  & Feder  18 
Reported  capital  gains  in  real  estate  were  understated  as  a result  of  exclusions.  On 
the  other  hand,  much  direct  investment  inchrded  the  cost  of land,  commercial  buildings,  and 
plant  and  equipment.  Taking  this  into  account,  we  estimate  that  roughly  70  percent  of  the 
capital  gains  calculated  by  the  IRS  for  1985  probably  represent  real  estate.  Even  this 
estimate  may  understate  the  role  of  land  and  real  estate.  In  1985,  anticipating  the  planned 
1986  tax  reform  which  would  raise  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  from  20  to  28  percent,  many 
investors  sold  their  securities  that  had  registered  the  largest  advances.  Some  40  percent  of 
the  capital  gains  reaped  by  selling  these  stocks  probably  represented  real  estate  gains.  A 
major  spur  to  the  LB0  movement  driving  up  the  stock  market  was  an  awareness  that  real 
estate  gains  were  not  being  reflected  in book  values  and  share  prices;36  as  land  prices  leapt 
upward-funded  in  part  by  looser  regulatory  restrictions  on  S&L  lending  against  land- 
raiders  bought  publicly  traded  companies  and  sold  off  their  assets,  including  real  estate,  to 
pay  off  their  junk-bond  backers.  In  effect,  not  only  were  rental  income  and  profits  being 
converted  into  a flow  of interest  payments;  so also  were  capital  gains. 
l  THE FEDERAL  RESERVE  DATA 
Federal  Reserve  Board  statistics  considerably  outstrip  the  1985  IRS  estimate  of 
$208  billion  of  taxable  capital  gains.  The  Fed’s Balance  Sheets  for  the  U.S.  Economy  lists 
the  total  value  of  land,  buildings  and  other  real  assets.  For  produced  capital,  the  annual 
increase  in aggregate  asset  values  does  not  distinguish  capital  gains  on  existing  assets  from 
the  value  of  new  production.  For  land,  however,  the  value  of  new  production  must  be  zero, 
so  the  entire  annual  increase  constitutes  capital  gains-accurately,  land  gains.  According  to 
the  Fed,  aggregate  building  values  increased  by  $204  billion  in  1985,  while  land  prices  rose 
by $356  billion,  more  than  three  and  a half times  the  value  implied  by the  IRS  statistics. 
The  Federal  Reserve  Board  provides  an  implied  estimate  of  land  gains  (and  a 
measure  of  building  gains  that  does  not  include  over-depreciation  pay-backs  recorded 
fictitiously  as  capital  gains)  in  its  Z9  release  estimating  asset  values  throughout  the 
economy.  However,  the  IRS  and  Fed  are  not  measuring  capital  gains  in the  same  way.  The 
Fed  measures  the  overall  nationwide  market  value  of  land  and  buildings,  while  the  IRS 
36  See Chart  6 for the assumpuons made as to the IRS breakdown  of capital  gains, by industry.  This 
estimate  closely  approximates  the Federal  Reserve’s statistics for land and real estate improvements  as a Hudson&Fedex  19 
sample includes only properties  sold during the year. Furthermore,  the IRS statistics  do not 
include capital gains on which no taxes are due because of exclusions. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Fed  statistics3’ understate  land  values  for  methodological 
reasons.  Starting  with  estimates  for  overall  real  estate  market  prices,  Fed  statisticians 
subtract  estimated  replacement  prices  for  existing  buildings  and  capital  improvements  to 
derive  land  values  as  a  residual.  These  replacement  prices  are  based  on  the  Commerce 
Department’s  index  of  construction  costs.  Thus,  building  values  are  estimated  to  increase 
steadily over time, on the implicit assumption  that all such property  is worth  reproducing  at 
today’s rising costs. 
However,  the  value  of  any  building  tends  eventually  to  decline,  until  finally  it  is 
scrapped and replaced.  It is the value of land which tends to  rise as population  and income 
grow  (over  the  long  run,  with  cyclical  swings),  precisely  because  no  more  land  can  be 
produced.  Thus, capital gains in real estate result mainly from land appreciation. 
Building  values  fall  because  of  physical  deterioration,  but  also  because  buildings 
undergo  locational  obsolescence  as neighborhood  land  uses  change  over  time,  so  market 
prices  tend  to  fall below  replacement  costs.  It  would  not  be  economical  to  rebuild  many 
types  of structures  on the  same site if they were  suddenly  destroyed.38 In particular,  where 
land  use  is  intensifying  over  the  long  run,  rising  land  values  effectively  drain  the  capital 
value  out  of  old  buildings.  This  is  because  the  salvage  value  of  land  (its  worth  upon 
renewal) tends to rise, while the scrap or salvage value of most immovable  improvements  is 
negligible.  Where  land  has  alternative  uses,  rent  is  not  its  current  net  income  but  its 
opportunity  cost-the  minimum yield required by the market  to warrant  keeping the land in 
its present  use instead  of converting  it to the best alternative  use. As the  land value rises, a 
rising share of the property  income  must be imputed to the land and a falling  share remains 
to be imputed to the improvements.39 
proportion of the US ec43nomy’s  net assets. 
37  Balance  Sheets for  the  U.S. Economy,  1945-94, Tables B. 11, B. 12 and R 11. 
38  Sometimes, to be sure, there is a renaissance, as when gentrifkation occurs.  Land use is currently being 
shifted away from industry to residential development in the center of cities much the same way that it is 
being shifted away from agricultural uses to residential development at the outer margins of cities. However, 
gentrikation  comes because entire industrial areas have lost their value.  In New York, it occurred in the 
Tribeca and Soho neighborhoods in southern Manhattaq  resulting in more than 10,000 residential Ioft 
conversions during the city’s economic downturn in the 1970s. In Chicago, it occuning  west of the Loop, 
and on the Near North Side. 
3g  Indeed, where ill-maintained old buildings occupy prime locations, a parcel may be more valuable once Hudson k  Feder  20 
Thus,  the  correct  way  to  separate  land  values  from  building  values  is  to  appraise 
land  values  directly  in terms  of  opportunity  cost-how  much  would  a vacant  lot  at that  site 
fetch  in the  market?  If the  observed  market  value  of the  improved  property  exceeds  the  land 
value,  the  residual  is  the  implied  value  of  the  standing  improvements.  The  Fed’s  land- 
residual  method  theoretically  understates  the  land  share  of  real  estate  values.40  The  pitfall  of 
this  methodology  is demonstrated  to  an  almost  comical  degree  by the  fact  that  according  to 
Fed  statistics,  the  land  component  of  corporately  owned  real  estate  has  been  reduced  to 
near  zero  over  the  past  five  years  (while  the  nominal  reproduction  costs  of  factories  and 
other  corporately  held  buildings  are  inflating). 
The  measurement  problem  is  exacerbated  by  assessment  bias  in  many  states  and 
localities.  Particularly  where  land  values  are  trending  upward,  overestimates  of  building 
values  relative  to  site  values  reflect  the  steady  under-assessment  of  land.  Note  that  as  a 
larger  share  of  real  estate  value  is imputed  to  buildings,  a larger  share  of  cash  flow  can  be 
claimed  as  depreciation.  In  effect,  assessment  bias  allows  investors  to  partly  depreciate 
land,  at no  cost  to  local  government  budgets.41 
Official  statistics  should  provide  a  sense  of  proportion  as  to  how  the  economy 
works.  Especially  when  it  comes  to  real  estate,  however,  national  income  statistics  tend  to 
obtiscate  more  than  they  reveal.  They  are  the  product  of  income-tax  filings,  and  hence  are 
distorted  for  both  administrative  and  political  reasons;  they  do  not  reflect  fundamental 
categories  of  economic  analysis.  One  searches  in vain,  for  example,  for  an  estimate  of  the 
distribution  of  total  income  among  land,  labor,  and  capital,  or  for  an  accounting  of  how 
rentier  claims  on  revenue  and  output  are  layered  upon  directly  productive  enterprise. 
the building  is demolished  and the lot cleared  for reuse See Gaffney  (1993 and also  1971). Some 
improvements,  such as gas stations  and refineries,  are accompanied  by ecological  pollution,  which  can be 
analyzed  as a negative  improvement-the  property  would be worth more without  it.  Pollution  may greatly 
increase  the saIvage cost of land  making  it uneconomical  to salvage some lands despite the value  they 
would have if clean.  This  “brownfields”  problem  has received  considemble  public notice  in recent  months. 
4a  Gafflley  (1993). 
41  Studies cited by Gafikey  (1993) of assessed building  values at demolition  indicate  a tendency  of assessors, 
too, to overvalue  depreciable  improvements.  At the  moment  of demolition  for  example,  a building’s  value 
equals  its scrap value  (if any)  minus  the cost of demolition.  The  result  can  easily  be negative.  That  is, the 
cleared  land  may  be worth  more  than  the  parcel  is worth  with  the  old building  standing  and  its  cleanup 
costs yet to be borne.  The  IRS may question  specific building  appraisals,  but the general  practice  is to accept 
the local  city assessment,  which  tends  to favor  buildings  over  land  It is welI known  that  Fed  statistics  on 
the value of corporate  land and buildings  show an unrealistic  low valuation  of land. Hudson 62 Feder  21 
6.  The  Political  Context  of  Real  Estate  Taxation 
Much  of  the  public  discussion  of  capital  gains  policy  has  been  conducted  with  little 
reference  to  empirical  research  as  to  their  actual  character  and  composition  in  the  US 
economy.  Capital  gains,  and  savings  in  general,  are  defended  on  the  assumption  that  they 
are  automatically  transformed  into  new  direct  investment.  Yet  the  more  layers  has  the  debt 
pyramid,  the  smaller  is  the  proportion  of  savings  used  to  finance  direct  investment. 
Moreover,  our  investigation  suggests  that  a  large  and  expanding  share  of  the  economy’s 
capital  gains-as  they  are  defined,  measured  and  taxed-has  little  discernible  impact  on  net 
investment  or  employment. 
IRS  estimates  of  capital  gains  measure  only  the  small  proportion  that  individuals  are 
obliged  to  declare  after  all  the  exemptions  and  exclusions  have  been  utilized.  There  is  no 
estimate  of the  volume  of  capital  gains  generated  each  year,  and  no  adequate  breakdown  as 
to  where  these  gains  occur.  This  statistical  lacuna  means  that  the  economic  cost  of  assorted 
tax  loopholes  is  not  being  calculated.  i%ere  is  no  sound  statiistica  basis  for  calculating 
the  total  returns  being  tien  by  investors,  or  the  proportion  of  those  returns  paid  in 
taxes. 
When  statistics  are  lacking,  it often  is because  some  interest  groups  are  benefiting  in 
ways  they  prefer  not  to  see  quantified  and  publicized.  If  land  assessments  lag  behind  actual 
increases  in  market  value,  for  instance,  land  speculators,  as  well  as  homeowners,  will  pay 
less  than  their  legislated  tax  share.  Also-and  of  direct  relevance  to  our  thesis-the  failure 
to  distinguish  statistics  on  land  values  and  other  real  estate  gains  from  non-real-estate 
capital  gains  in industry  and  finance  makes  it easier  for  the  real  estate  industry  to  get  its own 
taxes  reduced  along  with  industries  in which  capital  gains  tax  cuts  do  indeed  tend  to  spur 
productivity. 
Academic  economists  likewise  have  been  remarkably  slow  to  address  this  shift  away 
from  earned  income  to  capital  gains.  It  is true  that  nineteenth-century  land  reformers  such 
as John  Stuart  Mill  and  Leon  Wahas  defined  land-value  gains  as  an  “unearned  increment,” 
and  urged  that  they  be  collected  by  the  community  at  large,  whose  economic  activity  was, 
afler  all, responsible  for  creating  these  gains.  Ever  since  Henry  George  brought  matters  to  a Hudson &  Fedex  22 
head  in Progress  und  Poverty  (1879),  however,  economics  has  largely  dropped  the  analysis 
of land-value  gains,  and  indeed,  of  land  itself42 
Wealthy  investors  have  won  congressional  support  for  real  estate  exemptions  in 
large  part  by mobilizing  the  economic  ambitions  of homeowners.  Most  families’  major  asset, 
after  all, is their  home.  Two  Federal  Reserve  studies  trace  the  rise  in gross  house  value  from 
26  percent  of  household  wealth  in  1962  to  30.1  percent  in  1983  (falling  back  to  28.5 
percent  in  1989).43 Household  real  estate  assets  substantially  exceeded  holdings  of  stocks, 
bonds  and  trust  tinds  (20.5  percent  in  1989),  liquid  assets  (17  percent)  and  total  debt  (14 
percent).44  The  giveaway  to  real  estate  interests  is  thus  presented  ostensibly  as  a  popular 
middle  class  measure.  The  real  estate  industry  (and  the  financial  sector  riding  on  its 
shoulders)  have  found  that  the  middle  classes  are  willing  to  cut  taxes  on  the  wealthy 
considerably,  as long  as their  own  taxes  are  cut  even  lightly.  It  is no  surprise  that  President 
Clinton’s  first  major  concession  to  the  pressure  for  cutting  capital  gains  taxation  is directed 
at  homeowners,  despite  the  fact  that  preferences  for  home  ownership  cannot  be justified  as 
a boost  to  entrepreneurial  investment.  Such  is  the  foreshortened  economic  perspective  of 
our  times. 
The  LB0  movement  epitomizes  the  real  estate  industry‘s  strategy,  applying  the 
developer’s  traditional  debt-pyramiding  techniques  to  the  buying  and  selling  of 
manufacturing  companies.  Raiders  emulated  developers  who  borrowed  money  to  buy  or 
construct  buildings  and  make  related  capital  improvements,  agreeing  to  pay  interest  to  their 
mortgage  bankers  or  other  lenders,  putting  down  as  little  equity  of  their  own  as  possible. 
Having  set  things  in  motion,  the  landlord  uses  the  rental  income  to  carry  the  interest, 
principal,  taxes  and  maintenance  charges  while  he  waits  for  a  capital  gain  to  accrue.  The 
idea  is to  amortize  the  loan  as  slowly  as possible  so  as to  minimize  annual  carrying  charges, 
while  paying  them  out  of the  CCA. 
For  many  decades  securities  analysts  have  pored  over  corporate  balance  sheets  in 
search  of  undervalued  real  estate  whose  book  value  does  not  reflect  gains  in  market  value. 
From  the  merger  and  acquisition  movement  of  the  1960s  through  the  takeover  wave  of  the 
42 Gaffney and Harrison (1994). 
43 1962  Survey of Financial  Characteristics  of Consumers,  and its subsequent Survey of Consumqr 
Finances  for 1983,  1986,  1989,  and  1992. 
*  Details are reported in Bureau of the Census (1988). Hudson  62 Feder  23 
198Os, the  raider’s  strategy  has  been  to  borrow  money  to  buy  the  target  company’s  stock, 
and  then  sell off  its real  estate  and  other  assets  to  repay  the  creditors,  hoping  that  something 
will  be  lefl  for  himself  after  settling  the  debts  incurred  in the  process.  For  the  bankers  and 
other  creditors,  LBOs  were  a way  to  put  savings  to  work  earning  higher  rates  of  interest. 
The  ensuing  junk  bond  commotion  pushed  interest  rates  over  15  percent  for  high-risk 
securities,  whose  major  risk  was  that  quick  capital  gains  and  the  cash  flow  available  from 
re-depreciating  properties  would  not  cover  the  interest  payments  to  the  institutional 
investors  rounded  up  by Drexel  Bumham  and  the  other  investment  bankers  who  underwrote 
the  takeovers. 
.  The  object  of  building,  like  buying  and  selling  companies,  is thus  by  no  means  only 
to  earn  rental  income.  Most  cash  flow  is pledged  to  lenders  as debt  service  in any  case.  In  a 
world  of  income  taxation  subject  to  loopholes,  sophisticated  investors  aim  not  so  much  to 
make  profits  as  to  reap  capital  gains -not  only  in the  stock  and  bond  markets,  but  also  in 
real  estate,  other  natural  resources,  and  the  monopoly  privileges  that  have  come  to  underlie 
much  of the  pricing  of  securities  today. 
As developers  borrow  money  to  finance  real  estate  purchases,  lenders,  for  their  part, 
use  the  real  estate  sector  as  a market  to  absorb  and  service  the  economy’s  mounting  stock 
of  savings,  applying  most  of  the  rental  cash  flow  to  pay  interest  to  savers.  The  end  result  is 
that  most  total  returns  are  taken  by  the  wealthiest  ten  percent  responsible  for  nearly  all the 
economy’s  net  saving.  Viewing  US  economic  statistics  from  this  perspective  shows  that  not 
to  calculate  capital  gains  in the  national  income  accounts  alongside  directly  “earned”  income 
helps  foster  the  illusion  that  more  equality  exists  among  Americans  than  actually  is the  case. 
The  fact  is that  earned  income  is more  equally  distributed  than  unearned  gains. 
This  distinction  between  real  estate  (and  by  extension,  other  natural  resource 
industries  and  monopolies)  and  the  rest  of  the  economy  helps  explain  the  familiar  economic 
rule  that  inequalities  of wealth  tend  historically  to  exceed  inequalities  of  income.  The  reason 
is that  the  wealthiest  layers  of  society  control  even  more  of  the  economy’s  assets-and  the 
capital  gains  on  these  assets-than  they  do  its  income.  They  also  obtain  a larger  proportion 
of cash  flow  and  other  non-taxable  income  than  they  do  of taxable  “earned”  income. 
This  phenomenon  has  long  been  known,  but  not  well  explained.  Edward  Wolff  has 
shown  that  wealth  is more  unequally  distributed  than  income,  but  he  leaves  capital  gains  out Hudson &  Feder  24 
of  account  in  explaining  how  the  American  economy  has  grown  more  top-heavy.4’  It  is 
unequal  wealth  that  is primarily  responsible  for generating  inequality  of incomes.  The more 
the returns to wealth  can avoid taxation  by being categorized  as capital gains, the faster this 
inequality  will polarize  society. 
Given the  current  US depreciation  laws and related  institutions,  to lower the capital 
gains tax rate across the board  is to  steer capital and entrepreneurial  resources  into a search 
for  unearned  rather  than  earned  income.  It  rewards  real  estate  speculators  and  corporate 
raiders as it shifts the burden  of taxation  to  people  whose  primary  source  of income  is their 
labor.  The budget  crisis aggravated  by such a policy  also  ends up forcing  public resources 
to be sold off to  meet  current  expenses-sold  to the  very wealth-holders  being freed  from 
taxation.  In this way wealth  consolidates  its economic  power  relative to  the rest of society, 
and  translates  it  into  political  power  so  as to  shit? the  tax  burden  onto  the  shoulders  of 
others.  The  first  element  of  this  strategy  has been  to  defer  revenue  into  channels  that  are 
taxed only later, as capital gains. The second has been to tax these gains at a lower rate than 
earned  income--a  fight  that  has  broken  out  in  earnest  following  the  1996  presidential 
elections. 
43  WoltT (1995), p. 27. “The top one percent  of wealth  holders  has typically  held in excess of one-quarter  of 
total  household  wealth,  in comparison  to the 8 or 9 percent  share of income  received  by the top percentile  of 
the income  distribution. ” Hudson &  Fedex  25 
7.  Policy Conclusions 
Because  real  estate  investors  make  much  of  their  money  by  buying  and  reselling 
existing  properties,  much  as  financial  investors  buy  already  seasoned  stocks  and  bonds, 
many  real  estate  and  stock  transactions  have  no  new  employment  or  direct  investment 
effects  regardless  of the  capital  gains  incentives  being  offered.  Yet  the  tax  code  permits  real 
estate  investors  to  take  their  returns  mainly  in  the  form  of  capital  gains  and  declare  little 
taxable  ordinary  income.  FIRE  sector  investors  in the  finance  and  insurance  industries  also 
have  taken  their  income  in  ever  more  lightly  taxed  forms.  These  tax  subsidies  divert  effort 
and  ingenuity  out  of  productive  channels  and  into  speculation  on  already  existing  buildings 
and  land,  or  already  issued  stocks  and  bonds.  An  across-the-board  cut  in capital  gains  taxes 
would  favor  the  FIRI?  sector  rather  than  manufacturing,  steering  investment  money  Cuther 
from  active  to  passive  investment.  Far  greater  stimulus  to  productivity  is  to  be  expected 
from,  instead,  eliminating  special  privileges  and  closing  loopholes-while  reducing  taxes  on 
payrolls,  sales,  and  enterprise. 
Adam  Smith  and  subsequent  classical  economists  defined  some  forms  of  investment 
and  income  as  being  more  productive  than  others,  suggesting  a  normative  basis  for 
evaluating  legislation  on  the  basis  of  economic  efficiency  and  productivity.  Although  there 
was  disagreement  as  to  details,  it  was  the  essence  of  classical  political  economy  to 
distinguish  productive  from  unproductive  investment.  Productive  investment  added  to 
revenue,  employment  and  wealth.  Unproductive  investment,  what  today  would  be  called 
zero-sum  transactions,  merely  redistributed  income. 
The  classical  economists  distinguished  the  earned  income  of  capital  and  labor  from 
what  they  deemed  unearned  income,  mainly  in the  form  of  land  rent  and,  by  extension,  the 
rent  of  public  monopolies  as  well  as  mines  and  other  natural  resources.  They  applauded 
industrial  profits  and  other  returns  to  the  factors  of  production;  they  C-owned  on  the  rentier 
takings  that  burdened  productive  effort.  Profits,  they  believed,  tended  to  be  recycled  into 
new  investment,  employing  yet  more  labor  to  increase  output,  while  rentier  income  was  a 
kind  of  economic  overhead.  A  fundamental  problem  was  the  tendency  of  rent  to  be 
dissipated  on  consumption  expenditures  to  maintain  the  rentier  lifestyle,  for  example,  to Hudson 8c  Fedex  26 
support  a retinue  of  servants  who  absorbed  income  rather  than  generating  new  growth  in 
revenue.  The  industrialists,  by  contrast,  tended  to  recycle  their  revenue  back  into  new 
capital  formation.  By  the  time  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  the  mainstream  of  British  political 
economy  defined  “capital  gains”  in land  and  real  estate  as economically  sterile. 
Thus  the  classical  view  of  economics  was  no  law  of  the  jungle.  It  endorsed  an 
institutional  shaping  of  the  market  place  so that  economic  self-interest  would  serve  society’s 
long-term  objectives.  Self-interest  was  the  mainspring,  but  j;:st  as  every  watch  needs 
controls  and  release  ratchets,  self-interest  had  to  be  harnessed  in  service  to  the  general 
welfare  and  steered  away  from  unproductive  or  corrosive  activities. 
The  after-tax  earnings  of  labor  and  enterprise  constitute  incentives  for  markets  to 
expand  economic  horizons.  They  generate  more  taxes  in  the  process,  as  well  as  more 
wealth.  Such  is  not  the  case  with  forms  of  wealth  appropriation  that  constitute  zero-  or 
negative-sum  transfers  from  consumers,  workers  and  other  taxpayers  to  corporate  raiders, 
privatizers,  real  estate  speculators  or  outright  crooks. 
Two  Republican  presidential  hopefuls,  Steve  Forbes  and  Lamar  Alexander,  sought 
unsuccessfully  to  win  voter  support  in the  primaries  by advocating  a flat-rate  tax  with  just  a 
few  exceptions.  The  exceptions  were  mortgage  interest-on  the  ground  that  taxing  it would 
reduce  the  value  of  much  of  the  nation’s  real  estate,  by  forcing  some  strapped  homeowners 
to  sell-and  capital  gains.  Yet  these  are two  of the  most  parasitic  ways  of getting  rich.  Bank 
credit  was  distorted  throughout  the  198Os,  away  from  financing  real  estate  trades  in 
preference  to  direct  industrial  investment  and  employment.  Speculators  borrowed  money  to 
buy  buildings,  agreeing  to  pay  their  rental  income  to  the  banker  (or  S&L,  insurance 
company  or  other  mortgage  lender)  at the  taxpayer’s  expense. 
Taxation  of  capital  gains  is widely  attacked  as  a  “soak  the  rich”  scheme,  a program 
of wealth  redistribution  that  will  adversely  afEct  growth  in productivity  and  efficiency.  Kurt 
Hauser’s  WaZZ  Street  JournaZ editorial  counters  this  with  the  observation  that  over hay  of 
all  taxpayers  reporting  capital  gains  have  adjusted  gross  incomes  of  under  $50,000, 
implying  that  a tax  cut  would  not  preferentially  benefit  the  wealthy.  He  neglects  to  observe, 
however,  that  the  poorer  half  of  taxpayers  account  for  less  than  ten  percent  of  the  total 
doZZar  vaZue of  capital  gains46-or  that  the  capital  gains  tax  is  virtually  the  only  remaining 
46  Hauser  (1995);  Wolff  (1995). HudsmLFeder  27 
federal  levy on real  estate  income.  Low  capital  gains tax  rates  and the  tax  deductibility  of 
mortgage  interest  have  contributed  to  the  polarization  of  wealth  distribution.  A  further 
reduction  in the  capital  gains rate  would  worsen  this maldistribution  by making  real  estate 
virtually  tax-f&  except  for  local  property  taxes,  which  fell  from  10 percent  to  just  7.4 
percent  of all taxes at all levels of government  between  1955 and 1989.47 
Time  columnist  John  Rothschild  recently  accused  opponents  of  a capital  gains tax 
cut  of resisting  “any reform,  no  matter  how  it may benefit  society  in general,”  simply  “so 
that  the  rich  cannot  benefit.l14* The  implication  is  that  any  resulting  growth  in  income 
inequality is the price a f?ee society  must pay for an efficient system of economic  incentives. 
Indeed,  it would  be diflicult  to  oppose  widely  shared progress  simply because  the  rich are 
gaining  faster than  the  rest of society.  The point,  however,  is that  the tax code  encourages 
the wealthy  to  enrich themselves  in ways that  are detrimental  to  the economy  at large.  The 
presumed  trade-off  between  equity  and efficiency  is mythical,  at least  with  respect  to  real 
estate under the current  federal tax code. 
An  inordinate  focus  on  stock  market  gains-especially  the  selection  of  small 
industrial  companies  such as a yacht  producer  just  making  his first  stock  offering--diverts 
attention  from  the  extent  to  which  a  low  capital  gains  tax  benefits  real  estate  investors 
preferentially.  The  irony  of casting  the  issue in terms  of the  stock  market  rather  than  real 
estate  investment  is that  financial  investors  have  already  devised  an array  of  strategies  to 
evade taxation  on stock  gains.  Institutional  investors  already  are exempt from capital  gains 
taxes on securities,  as they are on their real estate holdings. Wealthy  individual investors  can 
arrange  fictitious  “short”  sales  (“sales  against  the  box”),  obtaining  the  proceeds  of  their 
stocks  without  having  to  actually  sell  them,  by  collate&zing  them  with  a  bank  and 
borrowing  an amount  of money  equal to the value of the stocks.  This is the equivalent  of a 
sale, for it provides  immediate  proceeds-but  without  incurring taxes  on the  securities’ rise 
in value. Bankers  find this a lucrative  business, while the  Treasury  foregoes  revenue  at the 
expense  of  less  afIluent  taxpayers.  To  abolish  capital  gains  taxes  would  enable  these 
fictitious  “against  the  box” maneuverings  finally  to  be liquidated  without  having  paid  any 
taxes.  Also  freed  would  be  the  accumulated  over-depreciation  of  buildings  that  has 
sheltered past real estate  income. 
47 Rosen  (1992),  p. 22. Hudson  & Fedex  28 
If  the  intention  is  to  provide  an  incentive  for  new  direct  investment,  employment, 
and  industrial  modernization,  then  an across-the-board  capital  gains  tax  cut  is at best  a blunt 
policy  instrument.  We  have  examined  several  reasons  to  doubt  that  further  cuts  in  capital 
gains  taxes  will  have  a pronounced  incentive  effect  on  new  direct  investment.”  Capital  gains 
tend  to  reward  accumulation  of  old  assets  more  than  production  of  new  wealth.  The  stock 
market  is mostly  a  second-hand  market,  but  we  do  not  lean  too  hard  on  this  point  because 
the  (discounted)  anticipation  of  future  capital  gains  may  boost  the  demand  for  new  stock 
issues,  making  it  somewhat  easier  for  corporations  to  finance  new  investment.  The  main 
point  is that  most  taxable  capital  gains  represent  appreciation  of  non-produced  land  and  of 
structures  built  years  ago.  In  the  current  institutional  setting,  real  estate  gains  are  artificially 
inflated  by generous  depreciation  rules,  which  apply  not  only  to  newly  constructed  buildings 
but  also  to  second-hand  buildings  and  even,  effectively,  to  land,  which  neither  depreciates 
nor  is  replaced.  As  long  as  these  and  other  rules  are  in  place,  an  across-the-board  capital 
gains  tax  cut  will  preferentially  benefit  real  estate  and  financial  speculation  at the  expense  of 
industrial  production.  It  will  also  increase  the  federal  budget  deficit,  ultimately  at  the 
expense  of lower-  and  middle-income  taxpayers. 
One  reason  often  cited  for  taxing  capital  gains  at lower  rates  than  ordinary  income  is 
to  exempt  “phantom  income”  arising  from  inflation.  The  logic  of  indexing  is  that  if  prices 
rise  by,  say,  50 percent  between  the  time  of  purchase  and  the  time  of  sale,  then  this  amount 
should  not  be taxed;  to  do  so would  be to  tax  investors  just  for  “staying  in place.”  However, 
inflation  erodes  all monetary  assets,  not  just  capital  gains,50  and  may  erode  the  purchasing 
power  of labor  income,  as has  occurred  for  most  wage-earners  in recent  years.  Equity  in the 
face  of inflation  is thus  a poor  argument  for  preferential  capital  gains  tax  rates. 
Four  conclusions  for  federal  tax  policy  are  summarized  below,  ranked  in  ascending 
order  as to  the  confidence  with  which  we  offer  them. 
a  Rothschild  (1995). 
4g A capital  gains tax cut may relieve  a lock-in  effect caused by taxing  capital  gains upon realization 
instead  of accrual.  However,  GatTney (199 l),  p. 50, writes that “the locked-in  effect  results  mainly from 
stepup  at death,  rather  than from  a high  rate per se.” 
50  GaEbey  (1991), pp. 49-53.  Inflation  amounts  to a general  wealth tax. Hudson&Feder  29 
.  Do  NOT REDUCE  CAPITAL  GAINS TAXES  ON BUILDINGS. 
We  agree  with  the  major  premise  that  to  reduce  taxation  the  earnings  of  productive 
enterprise  has  beneficial  incentive  effects.  However,  given  fiscal  rules  permitting  excess 
depreciation  of  buildings  to  be  recovered  by  deferred  capital  gains  taxation  at  preferential 
rates,  the  tax  code  subsidizes  speculation  in existing  properties  more  than  it  stimulates  new 
production.  As  real  estate  developers  know,  construction  responds  more  to  shifts  in interest 
rates  than  to  adjustments  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate.  Capital  consumption  allowances 
absorb  nearly  all the  rental  cash  flow  left  after  paying  mortgage  interest,  making  cash  flow 
virtually  exempt  from  income  taxes.  Because  foreign  investors  and  institutional  investors 
such  as pension  funds  and  insurance  companies  are  not  subject  to  capital  gains  taxes,  a tax 
cut  would  not  Sect  their  real  estate  operations  in any  event. 
l  Do  NOT PERMIT  BUILDINGS  TO BE DEPRECIATED  MORE THAN ONCE. 
The  only  point  at  which  much  of  the  real  estate  industry  now  pays  taxes  on  its 
accumulated  cash  flow  after  taking  capital  consumption  write-offs  is  when  the  building  is 
sold.  To  let  the  building  be  depreciated  all  over  again  is  to  transform  what  should  be  a 
current  income  tax  liability  into  a  deferred  capital  gains  tax.  This  gives  the  real  estate 
industry  a unique  gift.  Deferral  of  tax  liability  from  the  time  when  rental  income  actually  is 
earned  until  the  time  when  the  building  is sold  enables  the  property  to  avoid  paying  its  fair 
share  of  income  taxes,  transmuting  ordinary  income  into  a capital  gain  that  is taxed  at  a far 
lower  effective  rate  than  ordinary  income.  This  deferral  nearly  doubles  the  private  rate  of 
return  on  investment. 
As  long  as  capital  consumption  allowances  give  the  real  estate  industry  a peculiarly 
generous  income  tax  status,  real  estate  investors  will  do  what  they  can  to  impute  an 
excessive  proportion  of total  real  estate  value  to  depreciable  improvements.”  Moreover,  as 
long  as  real  estate  income  is  effectively  exempted  from  the  income  tax,  a  powerful  lobby 
will continue  the  drive  to  substitute  income  taxes  for  state  and  local  property  taxes.‘* 
51  Local assessors frequently  appear  to act in collusion  with landowners:  GafTney (1993). 
52  An ad valorem  tax on land  values  would  recapture  that part  of the  real  estate value  which  is created  by 
the  surrounding  community.  While  taxes  on pmduced  wealth  tend  to discourage  the  reproduction  of such 
wealth,  well-administered  taxes  on  the  market  value  or  annual  rent  of  land  are  among  the  least  intrusive 
forms  of taxation.  They  generate  no “excess burden  of taxation”  and  discourage  neither  the production  nor Hudson k  Feder  30 
.  Do  NOT REDUCE  CAPITAL  GAINS  TAXES  ON LAND. 
Land  is  created  by  nature,  not  by  human  investors.  Much  of  the  value  of  land, 
especially  urban  land,  is  determined  by  its  location  with  respect  to  surrounding  public  and 
private  infrastructure,  other  capital,  and  activities  of  all kinds.  Land  value  is  not  produced 
by the  investment  of  individual  landowners  and  users  (they  contribute  the  improvements).53 
Therefore,  to  the  extent  that  taxable  capital  gains  are  really  land  value  gains,  cutting  the 
“capital”  gains  tax  deters  no  new  capital  formation.  On  the  contrary,  to  cut  taxes  on  land 
gains  is  to  encourage  land  speculation,  inducing  less  intensive  use  of  central  lands  and 
thereby  raising  the  public,  private,  and  environmental  costs  associated  with  a  sprawling, 
inefficient  pattern  of  land  use.54  It  is  also  to  accelerate  rent-seeking  activities,  which 
consume  resources  in the  service  of redistribution,  not  production.55 
.  IMPROVE  THE  QUALITY  OF STATISTICS  AND REFORM  NIPA  ACCOUNTING 
PRACTICES. 
Estimates  of  capital  gains  from  various  sources  are  not  easily  found.  The  accounting 
methodology  frustrates  attempts  to  measure  the  total  return  to  investors,  which  includes 
asset  appreciation  as  well  as  current  income.  Statistics  based  on  tax  returns  conceal  and 
thereby  perpetuate  real  estate  tax  loopholes. 
Presently,  US  statistics  appear  to  undervalue  land  by  at  least  a  trillion  dollars  (at 
about  $4 trillion,  down  from  the  $5 trillion  estimated  in  1990).  The  Federal  Reserve  method 
of  calculating  land  and  improvement  values  by  estimating  a building’s  reproduction  cost  is 
inappropriate.  The  market  value  of  land  should  be  evaluated  independently,  rather  than 
the economic  use of land  (Tideman,  1994, p.  135). They  reduce  the incentive  to speculate,  and induce  more 
intensive  use of valuable  lands.  They  cannot  be shifted  to tenants  or consumers,  and they  do not erode  their 
own tax bases. Both  efficiency  and equity  are therefore  well served by focusing  taxes  on  land values.  High 
land taxes would also help counter  the widespread  tendency  to over-assess  buildings  (and hence,  to increase 
their permitted  CCA) relative  to land 
53  Macro-developments  where  developers  build entire  towns or neighborhood  enclaves  are sometimes 
understood  to increase  land rent in the sense that they internalize  location  ext&nalities;  this may reflect 
inconsistency  in the definition  of a land parcel  for assessment  purposes  (Feder,  1993, pp. 83-105).  Most 
such cases are urban or s&urban  redevelopments  that involve  large public subsidies, with public land 
turned  over at concessionary  prices  and with generous  tax abatements  (of-ten to large institutional  investors 
who are politically  well-connected). 
54  Fe&r  (1994), p.  146-148. Hudson  & Fe&r  31 
derived  by  subtracting  the  hypothetical  replacement  cost  of  buildings  Corn  market  real 
estate  values.  The  theoretically  correct  approach  is  the  building-residual  method  of  real 
estate  assessment,  as  we  noted  in  Section  5.  One  result  of  consistently  applying  the 
building-residual  method  would  be  to  raise  the  land  share  and  lower  the  building  share  of 
assessed  property  value,  and  thus  narrow  the  depreciation  loophole.56 
It  can  only  contuse  matters  to  debate  capital  gains  taxes  without  separately 
considering  three  major  sources:  real  estate  as  the  economy’s  largest  recorder  of  capital 
gains  (separable  in  turn  into  land  and  improvements);  other  direct  capital  investment;  and 
financial  claims  on  the  income  generated  by  this  capital  (stocks,  bonds,  and  packaged  bank 
loans  that  are  “securitized”).  In  the  real  estate  sector,  most  “capital  gains”  in the  colloquial 
sense  of  rising  market  prices  accrue  to  land,  but  IRS  statistics  mainly  catch  the  landlord’s 
fictitious  declaration  of  the  loss  in  building  values  through  over-depreciation.  The  present 
GNPNIPA  format  fails  to  differentiate  carefully  among  land,  produced  wealth,  and 
financial  claims. 
Economic  policy  should  distinguish  between  activities  which  add  to  productive 
capacity  and  those  which  merely  add  to  overhead  This  distinction  elevates  the  policy 
debate  above  the  level  of  merely  carping  about  inequitable  wealth  distribution,  an  attack  by 
have-nots  on  the  haves,  to  the  fundamental  issues.  What  ways  of  getting  income  deserve 
fiscal  encouragement,  and  how  may  economic  surpluses  best  be  tapped  to  support 
government  needs?  Policies  that  subsidize  rentier  incomes  while  penalizing  productive 
effort  have  grave  implications,  not  only  for  distributive  justice  and  social  harmony,  but  also 
for  economic  efficiency  and  growth. 
”  Gaflhey (1989); see also Gaffhey (1993). 
56 G&hey  (1993).  Also,  land and buildings  are frequently assessed in a scattershot pattern, with land for 
contiguous  parcels  showing  abrupt drop-offs or jumps.  An  entire  profession  of  appraisal litigators  has 
arisen; lawyers can get their clients’ property taxes reduced simply by finding  some seemingly similar low- 
valued properties. Such practices contribute to sharply under-valuing land in many areas. To overcome this 
administrative  problem,  smooth,  continuous  land  value  maps  should  be  created  using  geographic 
information systems computer technology,  and should be continuously updated using  land sales data. More 
frequent reassessment, especially  in  areas with  rapidly appreciating land values,  would  tend to  increase 
property  tax revenues and probably also to increase the land share of the total assessment. Hudson k  Feder 
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Table  1.  The  Evolution  of Capital  Gains  Tax Rates 
1942-43  25%  25%  88%  40% 
1944-4s  2s  2s  94  40 
1946-50  2s  2s  91  38 
1951  2s  2s  87.2  SO.8 
1952-53  26  26  88  52 
1954  26  26  87  52 
195563  2s  2s  87  52 
1964  2s  2s  77  so 
196567  2s  2s  70  48 
196849  2s  27.5  70  48 
1970  29.5  28  70  48 
1971  32.5  30  70  48 
1972-78  (act)  3s  30  70  48 
1978  (Nov)-June  ‘8 I  28  28  70  46 
June ‘81-86  20  28  so  46 
1987  28  34  38.5  40 
1988-89  33  34  33  34 
1990-92  8  34  31  34 
1993-9s  28  3s  39.6  3s 
Iidaximum  capital  Gains 
Tax Rate (%) 
Individuals  coluoratiolls 
Top Marginal  Income Tax  Rate 
Individuals  Coruorations 
Source:  American  Council for Capital Formation,  Center for Policy Research,  “Update: Questions and 
Answers on Capital Gains,” Sept.  1995,  based on Joint Committee on Taxation  (199S),  “Tax Treatment  of 
Capital Gains and Losses,”  JCSA-95,  February  13,1995,  and OEke  of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
office  of Tax  Analysis (198S),  “Report to Congress on the Capital Gains Tax  Reductions of 1978.” Hudson 62 Feder 
Table  2.  Estimated  Land  Gains  as a Percentage 
of Total  Reported  Capital  Gains,  1985 
Source  of  1985  Gains  Percent  x  % Land  =  Land Gains  % Capital  Other  as 
of Total  Gains  as %  Total  Impwmts  %  of Total 
Land  7.0 
Farmland  0.9 
Distribution  from  partnerships, 
fiduciaries  and  S-corporations  9.5 
Business  real  estate  10.3 
Rental  real  estate  11.8 
Principal  residences  19.0 
Corporate  stock  33.0 
Mutual  funds  1.0 
Bonds  and  other  securities  0.8 
Commodities  and  futures  0.2 
Business  machinery/equipment  1.5 
Farm  livestock  1.0 
Timber  0.2 
Other  assets  3.9 
100% 
100% 
80%  7.6 
80%  8.2 
40%  4.7 
40%  7.6 
20%  6.6 
20%  0.2 
7.0 
0.9 
10%  0.9 
20%  2.1 
60%  7.1 
60%  11.4 
20%  6.6 
20%  0.2 
TOTAL  1 00.0%  42.9%  28.3% 
Source:  US Treasury 